Tuesday, December 11, 2007
Decision making preferences; Symptoms in lung cancer
1)
Journal of the American Geriatrics Society has a longitudinal study about decision making preferences in the elderly. It looked at 147 patients with advanced illnesses (metastatic cancer, ALS, or heart failure with a likely prognosis of less than 2 years) who were prospectively followed for up to two years. They were asked a series of questions about how they wanted their physicians to make decisions for them if incapacitated (on a continuum from completely based on what they think the patient wants to completely based on what the physician thinks is best) as well as how they would want their loved ones to make decisions for them if they were incapacitated (on a continuum from the loved ones making decisions based on what they thought the patient would want to based simply on what the loved ones think is best for the patient...they were trying to capture how much patients would endorse a 'substituted judgment' ideal as opposed to a 'best interests' ideal). It is similar in some ways to this paper I recently blogged about - both papers use the same basic scale to measure decision making preferences (that post also explains what the 'blogging on peer reviewed research' icon is all about for those of you who missed it).
At baseline there was a wide spread of preferences, with most answers in the middle, however they were definitely skewed towards relying more on substituted judgment (and not 'best interests') and more passivity/reliance on physicians in regards to how they prefer to make decisions. The preferences regarding loved ones pretty much stayed stable over time, and not surprisingly older patients (over 80) endorsed a 'best interests' standard more than younger ones. Preferences for physician involvement for decision making shifted, slightly but significantly, towards more substituted judgment over time, particularly in college-educated patients.
Several points here: the findings broadly support the idea that patient's decision-making styles/preferences are stable overtime, suggesting that advance care planning - talking with people as to how they want decisions made when they are relatively healthy - is a reasonable endeavor. This is also further research that the ideal of substituted judgment may not even be much of an ideal (in the sense of being what we should be striving towards). Patients themselves don't endorse it, instead endorsing (I'm speaking broadly here) a mixture of patient preference and physician recommendation of what's in a patient's 'best interests.' This is of course how most patients, most of the time, make decisions anyway, and so none of this is surprising. There are very few patients, after all, who wouldn't take into account their physicians' recommendations about the best thing to do: this is what physicians do and if all patients needed to do was to look their problems up on WebMD and 'decide for themselves' physicians wouldn't be needed anyway.
Two questions raised by this study: what is going on behind those shifts towards substituted judgment over time by many of the patients in this study? What drives that - could this be a marker of something deeper in the way patients conceive their disease, their story, and their role in it, in some way that changes over time? The other question I had is what did the patients themselves think about this attempt at distinguishing between what people think is in their 'best interests' vs. what people think they, themselves, would choose? Wouldn't they choose what was in their best interests? While clearly patients went along with the research and answered these questions (and most of them wisely answered somewhere in the middle), did they think that these distinctions, which have historically been important from a medical-ethical-legal perspective, were in fact coherent, meaningful distinctions?
Sulmasy, D.P., Hughes, M.T., Thompson, R.E., Astrow, A.B., Terry, P.B., Kub, J., Nolan, M.T. (2007). How Would Terminally Ill Patients Have Others Make Decisions for Them in the Event of Decisional Incapacity? A Longitudinal Study. Journal of the American Geriatrics Society DOI: 10.1111/j.1532-5415.2007.01473.x
2)
Journal of Clinical Oncology has an article about symptom prevalence in lung cancer in relation to time of death. The study involved prospectively gathered symptom data from 400 Swedish patients (mean age 66 years) starting shortly after they were diagnosed with inoperable lung cancer. Data were gathered at multiple, pre-specified points up to 1 year after diagnosis. Symptom prevalence, intensity, and distress were all measured. Most patients died during that year, and the researchers analyzed their symptoms as a function of time before death (comparing those in the last month of life; last 1-2 months of life; 2-3 months; etc.).
Reflecting the number of data points they gathered, this article has a couple of the most astonishingly complicated tables I have ever seen in a clinical research article: if Edward Tufte was dead he'd be rolling in his grave. They are bad enough to be described as non-"human-readable." Thankfully, there is text to summarize them: breathing problems, pain, and fatigue were consistently rated as the most distressing symptoms, and most symptoms, notably pain and dyspnea, worsened as death approached. Half of the patients approached to participate in the study declined, and a good percent of them declined because they were too fatigued or ill-feeling; one wonders how much worse the findings would have been if these patients had participated.
The fact that symptoms and function worsen as one dies is not surprising or new (although rarely presented in such glorious detail). The more interesting finding is that symptom distress was less predicted by symptom intensity earlier on in the disease (later one distress and intensity closely correlated): pain and dyspnea were relatively mild early on, but still rated as among the most distressing. The authors speculate that anxiety/worry early on about future severe symptoms (of pain and dyspnea) may actually make low-grade pain and dyspnea that much distressing even early in the course of inoperable lung cancer. It's the worry about the symptoms, the realization that they will inevitably get worse, which make them so distressing early on. An interesting hypothesis raised by these data; one hopes they look into it further (it may be amenable to intervention via simple reassurance).
Tishelman, C., Petersson, L., Degner, L.F., Sprangers, M.A. (2007). Symptom Prevalence, Intensity, and Distress in Patients With Inoperable Lung Cancer in Relation to Time of Death. Journal of Clinical Oncology, 25(34), 5381-5389. DOI: 10.1200/JCO.2006.08.7874
3)
BMJ has a news article about the Royal College of Physicians audit on death & dying in UK hospitals.
"But hospitals were less good at delivering bad news. Only 57% of the patients had been told that they did not have long to live, and only 45% recognised the nature of their condition. However, over 80% of carers were aware of the diagnosis, indicating that staff find it easier to discuss the issue of dying with relatives and friends."
Or the patients, themselves, were too sick to even receive the news? This is not discussed in the news item. I'd be fascinated to see a similar audit done in the US, but doubt that will happen since we don't have an integrated health system.
4)
Thanks, Christian, for setting up the Pallimed donation celebration. We are doing this for you Pallimed readers who are also Pallimed appreciators and want to show it in this way. Thank you. And yes there's some schwag that Christian cooked up, as well the quite useful Hospice & Palliative Care Formulary (US version) that the editors at Palliativedrugs donated.


5 Responses to “Decision making preferences; Symptoms in lung cancer”
December 11, 2007
Drew,
Re the stability of advance care planning, I think it's difficult to effectively assess this issue without considering Dresser's critique of advance commitment, as well as the disability rights critique (effectively articulated by Carol Gill, among others).
To oversimplify: we know without question that the able-bodied are uniformly terrible at making quality-of-life determinations for even the severely disabled. That is, there is an abundance of evidence that disabled persons -- over time -- report a much higher quality-of-life than able-bodied persons would believe them to enjoy.
As such, it seems problematic for my own currently able-bodied self to try to speculate as to what my quality-of-life might be like if I were severly disabled (I'm thinking, perhaps, of Bauby's "The Diving Bell and the Butterfly," here). I'm pretty likely to considerably underestimate what my quality-of-life might be like in that scenario.
I am not here saying that advance directives are unethical or inappropriate, merely that the notion of advance commitment is somewhat ethically problematic.
December 11, 2007
To all,
The header for the blog is screwed up because I was trying to put up a winter theme and a clickable button for the fund raiser. Will work on it tomorrow night. Sorry it looks ugly.
December 12, 2007
Daniel thanks for the comments. Yes, it's been documented that patients with progressive disabilities usually acclimate to them, accept them, and can rate their quality of life relatively high (and it's been repeatedly shown that physicians underestimate their patients' qol). this is one of the reasons i worry about the use of health-related qol as an outcome in some palliative care research as opposed to global qol. There's often not much that can be done to fix hrqol in the terminally ill, but global qol, meaning making, the continuation of profoundly important relationships, etc., can all continue until the very end (at times).
for most people with a terminal illness the decisions made by proxies are more to do with exactly how the patient will die and less to do with decisions between death or long term disability.
the circumstances where this is more important are ones of when the decision is actually between (near certain) death and (near certain) long term disability - some post-stroke or anoxic brain injury scenarios come to mind. this is fundamentally not a problem with advance care planning however. insofar that it's an issue even for patients who can communicate a decision - they themselves don't know early on how they'd adapt longterm to a disability - and decisions then may not be what they'd decide in 2 years. having a proxy make a decision certainly complicates things, but it is still an issue even if the patient is decisional.
these issues will always be the case until medicine becomes perfect, or someone invents time travel, so will probably be with us a while. i don't fundamentally view them as ethical issues however, unless one argues that it is impermissible to ever make decisions about treatment limitations unless there is certainty about an outcome or it's unethical to make a decision on someone's behalf without being certain as to what they'd choose. medicine is a human endeavor, performed by human actors, and will always be subject to human imperfection and guesswork (as well as hope, fear, stubbornness, and grace) and we should not hold it to standards of perfection nor label earnest, humble attempts to make decisions on behalf of a severely ill non-communicative person 'unethical' because the decision is imperfect.
Blah blah blah, and back to reality. What I worry about is when family members tell me things like 'he said he'd never want to be in a nursing home,' or 'i could never put him in a nursing home.' both sentiments i can relate to, but not being able to imagine yourself in a NH when you're healthy is different than saying No to a NH when you're sick and don't have too many options, and people frequently do change their minds....
December 12, 2007
Drew,
I agree with the tenor of your comments, but I'm not sure I agree that the conceptual problems with the notion of advance commitment are not fundamentally ethical problems. Moreover, one need not expect certainty in any case to raise concern over the likelihood that one's able-bodied self cannot reliably predict one's wishes in a severely disabled, non-communicative state.
I completely agree that we should not hold out for perfect decisions, but I honestly do not see the concern over advance commitment as requiring perfect knowledge -- rather, it asks some difficult questions about the consequences of our imperfect knowledge. Moreover, if disability history is any guide, the consequences of the underestimation of the quality of life of disabled persons have been severe. Still today a great number of utilization decisions are made based on QALYs, which are patently disablist.
In any case, I did not intend to draw any conclusions here, but simply to note that I think the entire notion of advance directives ought to engage the conceptual problems with advance commitment and disability. And I see these problems as raising very serious ethical concerns that I feel uncomfortable minimizing because we can never have perfect knowledge about what we might want at some time X in the future.
December 13, 2007
Your mention of QALYs is well-taken. I saw this fantastic talk by Bosario at the last Montreal palliative conference in which he was talking about qol in ALS patients. He was showing a close-up photo of a patient (wheelchair, peg-tube, trach) and talking about his qol and disabilities. then he showed the same photo from further away, showing the patient's spouse standing behind him, holding his hand; they were both smiling. The point was simply that this man rated his global qol very high, and that is because he continued to have rewarding and meaningful relationships. his health-related qol, by any standard, would be awful - a 'bad outcome' and the QALY's would look awful to 'keep him alive.'
Thus the danger of hrqol, and qaly's.
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